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I consider myself among a band of heretics seeking to deanthropocentrise 
environmental education. And yet, I increasingly struggle with blanket 
condemnations and recommendations. I do not know if the binary is as real or 
useful as I once thought. In this paper, I unearth some of the ways in which alleged 
anthropocentrisms can be nonanthropocentric, and vice versa. They seem much 
more fluid to me now. My purpose is not pedantic: I think environmental educators 
need to be more careful in their diagnoses and prescriptions. As we grope toward 
sustainability, we need pedagogies that help students imagine and engage with 
what our various claims and conceptualisations actually do when believed (if 
indeed they do anything at all); pedagogies that develop suppleness in our 
capacity to modify beliefs in alignment with intentions, and that help us modify 
these intentions in turn. I believe confronting the instability of dualistic thinking 
reveals paradoxes inherent in human reason, ushering a dose of humble 
bafflement essential for navigating the (non)Anthropocene. 
 




Rather than asserting that anthropocentric or nonanthropocentric positions exist and 
debate which is more normatively acceptable for environmental education, we might instead 
begin to ask in what ways a given thought, belief or practice is anthropocentric and 
nonanthropocentric, and to what effect. My purpose here is to explore anthropocentrism’s fluid 
binary through various ethical, epistemological, ontological, causal, phenomenological, and 
performative or pragmatic lenses. But first, a brief historical portrayal pocked with omissions, 
then on to the task at hand.  
Anthropocentrism has been critiqued widely in environmental philosophy and ethics 
(Kahn 2007), which has in turn informed (and in some cases has been informed by) 
environmental (e.g. Bell and Russell 2000; Kahn 2010; Kopnina et al. 2018a) and sustainability 
education (Kopnina 2012). Well known to readers of this journal, a debate between 
anthropcentrism and nonanthropocentrism pit 'deep' against 'shallow' ecology, with the former 
intending environmental change through nurturing acknowledgement of the 'intrinsic' value of 
nonhuman beings and processes, and the latter settling instead on an 'instrumental' 
environmental ethic that has humans protect beings and resources necessary for their own 
needs (Naess, 1973). In this context, shallow ecology is said to be ‘anthropocentric’ because it 
places humans as the sole bearers of morally significant concern and value (e.g. Passmore 
1974). Deep ecology’s 'biospheric egalitarianism,' sometimes conceived as giving humans no 
more ethical considerability than other species, was by contrast seen to be nonanthropocentric. 
In another influential vein, anthropocentrism was also critiqued by ecofeminists (e.g. Plumwood, 
1993), who saw anthropocentrism/biocentrism as one among many connected dualisms that 
worked to create and maintain hierarchies and power structures. In this sense, the split was 
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seen as genealogically related to, and complicit in, other violent splits including male/female, 
reason/emotion, mind/matter, and white/other. 
 
While recent debates have primarily assumed anthropocentrism is about where and how 
we place value (e.g. Payne 2010; Spannring 2017; Kopnina et al. 2018b), it is important to 
acknowledge that deanthropocentrising is not exclusively about value in either environmental 
philosophy or environmental education. Often the focus has been whether a claim is 
conceptually or ontologically anthropocentric (e.g. Rautio 2012; Mylius 2018). A certain notion or 
way of framing communication, freedom, causal potency, rationality, consciousness, or some 
other trait(s) can be seen as anthropocentric, with relevance for ethics (a few steps) removed. In 
some cases, ethical claims -even those apparently biocentric or ecocentric- are accused of 
being silently motivated by human centredness (e.g. Drenthen, 2011). For instance, while deep 
ecology is often claimed to not be anthropocentric, some wonder whether its emphasis on self-
realisation really goes beyond placing humans at the centre. For example, Grey (1993) 
identifies a tension between the deep ecologist’s problem and solution: pollution and destruction 
are foregrounded as non-natural processes associated with the exceptional human, but the 
remedy is for people to realise humans are not exceptional and are fully a part of nature. 
Plumwood (1993) asserts this is because deep ecology retains a “discontinuity thesis” rather 
than acknowledging that humans are both a part of and separate from nature. There is also the 
metaethical question of whether it is anthropocentric for humans to create any value system at 
all, even if the system of values is itself non-anthropocentric in its allegiances (see Attfield, 2011 
for some discussion of this).  
Is it desirable to imagine a view that has no residues of humanness? Is it possible? 
These are among the questions that “new materialisms” engage. As a thought experiment, let’s 
take an extreme example. Can you imagine some wily nonanthropocentrist defending the 
existence of nuclear waste or the Great Pacific Garbage Patch on the grounds that such 
material is ‘of’ the world as much as anything else? Such an antagonist might claim there is no 
such thing as anything truly ‘artificial’ (because humans are never isolated causal subjects and 
are always co-actors in material assemblages), and that the attempt to judge one thing as good 
and another as bad (say ocean with or without plastic) marks the imposition of humanly derived 
moral criteria onto the world. We might be asked to ‘go with the flow’ and accept in sublime 
resignation the power of the self organising (or disorganising) universe, ceaselessly creating 
and destroying itself in a massive process we should not (and in any case, cannot) control. 
Fleeting awe or fear-wrenching humility notwithstanding, dystopic sublimity is probably 
not the sort of nonanthropocentrism we are going for (acclerationists and dark mountainists may 
disagree). Rather, this abysmal asymptote gapes back at us, warning of other black holes that 
may also lie waiting at the edges of our eager deanthropocentrising projects. Ideas such as a 
Deleuzian ethics of immanent becoming; a flat ontology that rejects hierarchies in the realm of 
being (e.g. Bennett 2009); a commitment to removing not just normative anthropocentrism but 
conceptual, causal, and metaphysical ones too; a tendency to favour consideration of 
impersonal, postphenomenological 'affects' (e.g. Massumi 1980); and a radical doubting of any 
conceptual split between humans (and their artefacts), and 'nature' symbiotically creep towards 
the logical conclusion that there is no ethical justification against seas of plastic or skies of 
dioxin. Posthumanists seem to prefer theoretical dissonance to moral nihilism, because when it 
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comes to the ethical implications of their ontologies, I too often see the urge to backpeddle from 
the edge and introduce cloaked anthropocentrisms (valuing life over nonlife, health over 
nonhealth, diversity over simplicity, values over nonvalues etc.). If the reader is committed to 
posthumanism or deanthropocentrising, I invite them to consider why they reject the sea of 
plastic, in what ways that rejection is founded on some value, and whether this value could 
possibly be void of anthropocentric residue. Rather than imply we should continue the 
wholesale eviction of the 'human', perhaps we ought to think more carefully about how 
anthropocentrism and nonanthropocentrism combine, co-occur and co-evolve in thought, feeling 
and action. This paper makes steps in that direction. 
Hit the breaks we must, so where should we do it? One of the principle challenges of the 
posthuman project is to work out the extent to which we are able to let go of the human frame, 
and to what extent we need to hold onto it. The problem is somewhat subtle, however, as it is 
not at all clear where one frame begins and the other ends. I have been told by cynical friends 
that humans are catalysts to produce more plastic, itself an upcoming niche and opportunity for 
evolutionary development, perhaps not different from how oxygen, a toxic bi-product of 
cyanobacteria, became a crucial component of aerobic metabolism (Margulis and Sagan, 2000). 
However callous such a view is towards the plight of those facing current and future harm, one 
nevertheless detects an anthropocentrism even in their appeal to the values of change, growth 
and prospect. What is considered nonanthropocentric in one way is always anthropocentric in 
another, and vice versa. This unavoidability is to be accepted, dealt with, and eventually 
cherished. For example, the claim that valuing an ocean free of plastic is anthropocentric itself 
values a humanly-constructed argument that plastic is natural (itself derived from a very 
culturally specific definition of 'nature') over the effects this plastic might have on the biological 
life of the sea and those who depend on it. Unless the term 'anthropocentric' (and its apparent 
alternatives) is considered with more nuance, and in particular with an eye on what these 
concepts actually do, environmental educators advocating 'worldview' change are bound to 
continue debating at an overgeneralised and counterproductive level of abstraction.  
Prefiguring the logic of this paper’s plotline, Bonnett (2004), like Nietzsche (1966) before 
him, noted that attempts to live according to nature are invariably anthropocentric: we select 
certain aspects of ecological phenomena to guide action, such as beauty or stability, over say 
chaos and upheaval. If it is inevitable that humans anthropocentrically select what to 
deanthropocentrise (equally, if it is inevitable that the more-than-human world has constructed 
us to be anthropocentric), then the problem for environmental educators can be stated with 
more precision. Rather than setting out to defend one pole of a crude dichotomy, the challenge 
lies in identifying concrete situations given thoughts, experiences, models, practices, and 
pedagogical experiences foreground and background the human, how these ways interact with 
one another, and what effects this has on people and the planet. We are left with a series of 
overlapping micro-dichotomies that shift and interact, forever banished from the a priori comfort 
of a totalising position by which to prescribe thought or pedagogy. While this does not make 
practice 'easy' for educators, it does have important consequences that will be explored in the 
discussion section of this paper.  
Welcome to the (non)anthropocene.  
I would like to propose a premise which I invite the reader to dispute. I suggest that in 
the very attempt to choose criteria by which to initiate deanthropocentrising, anthropocentric 
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criteria invariably sneak in. Like a balloon, our attempts to grasp it merely squeeze the balloon 
out of our palm. The desire to rid our thoughts and activities completely of anthropocentrism 
fails from the outset for different reasons, but most basically because it denies a ‘centredness’ 
that preceded and heralded humanness. Pre-human apes were apecentric, a nonhuman 
condition for the possibility of the evolution of humans. The phenomenon of centredness is itself 
a creative and productive mode which matter takes on, and it is incoherent to dismiss it outright 
in favour of, say subjectless webs and processes of becoming. Tipping the scales in favour of 
the latter implies choosing the artefacts of a culturally located (be it scientific or otherwise) 
abstraction developed through human interests, pursuits and ways of knowing the world. 
Phylogenetics aside, on what basis are webs or processes of becoming permitted to extinguish 
an allegedly ‘folk psychology’ conception of the self that may sometimes tie us into more 
empathetic and responsive relationships with beings in the world? But on the other hand, when 
does that folk psychology get in the way? How would we know? 
 
 In the subsections below, I explore several (non)anthropocentric positions that can be 
considered in EE practice: multicentrism and noncentrism, process oriented materialisms, 
anthropocentrism vs anthropomorphism, and experiential (non)anthropocentrism achieved 
through meditation. This list is neither thorough nor exhaustive. One purpose is to show that 
anthropocentrism is not one thing (there are many different kinds with different implications), nor 
is it stable (one can shade into another or its opposite in different circumstances), and it is not 
necessarily to be avoided by posthumanist environmental educators. While this dynamism may 
remind the reader of Derridean difference (1998), I do not attribute the instability of these 
concepts to human textuality. Instead, I assert it is the result of humans emerging and yet 
remaining embedded within complex webs of more-than-human causalities. Human meaning is 
unstable as a consequence of this originary and ongoing emplacement. Acquainting ourselves 
with the paradox of (non)anthropocentrism is part of accepting the way we are interconnected 
within the world, a nonreductive practice that deepens ecological understanding. However, if all 
available conceptions are in some way both anthropocentric and nonanthropocentric, we are 
called to ask what a given framing foregrounds and to what effect, and to draw out nascent 
alternative dimensions when such framings are problematic. Through accepting the fluid and 
productive interconnection between these modalities, educators can develop a lithe repertoire of 
modes of thinking that can be employed with students to dislodge sedimented thinking. I hope 
this interrogation can lead to more practice-oriented nuance for my own work as much as for 
others. May this binary be more fruitful with its fluidity released, our senses piqued to its 
prospects and challenges, and all our relations bettered thereby. 
 
Multicentred approaches  
 There are a variety of multicentred ways of attempting to fly out of the orbit of 
anthropocentrism. It is helpful to consider them, in part because they foreground what is at 
stake when we talk about going beyond the human frame. For instance, Weston (2004) 
proposed a multicentric ethic to replace a human-centric one. His concern was that prominent 
approaches to animal and environmental ethics worked by expanding the circle of ethical 
consideration outwards to include other species (e.g Regan (1983) and Singer (1975)). Doing 
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this, he argued, kept the human firmly at the centre, as other species’ considerability was 
always judged in reference to people.  
Weston proposed instead that other beings can and should be considered their own 
centres of ethical consideration. Rather than expanding our circle we should recognise other 
ethical circles. Is Weston’s multicentrism nonanthropocentric? It depends. Weston’s attempt to 
think multiple centres certainly seems to privilege the idea of a 'centre' for ethical consideration. 
Is this then its own version of expanding a circle? To be centre-centred is still a form of 
anthropocentrism, the argument would go. It still ascribes value on the basis of a thing’s 
capacity to even be a centre, which was grasped as valuable through appealing to our own self-
centredness (so to speak). Perhaps. If so, should it be dismissed purely on that ground? 
 A different form of multicentrism comes from scholars working in autopoietic and related 
'enactivist' traditions (Maturana and Varela 1988; Thompson 2007). Autopoiesis is the notion 
that an organism constitutes itself as a unity that relates to an environment-for-it, and this 
self/environment interface is both the process and the product of its ongoing activity. All living 
beings are centres, indeed this is what distinguishes life from nonliving beings. Autopoiesis, like 
its Uexkullian predecessors (ex. Uexkull 2011), challenges the perceptual and cognitive 
anthropocentrism articulated in Kantian epistemology, which continues to manifest in various 
subjectivisms from phenomenology through to postmodernism. Such approaches focus on how 
subjectivity is humanly constituted against the unknowability of the world 'itself.' This allegedly 
leads to a uniquely human epistemological split between the world of appearance and the real, 
but forever unknowable world (or between what Kant calls phenomena and noumena). Rather 
than rejecting this epistemology outright, autopoietic theory argues that this split is the process 
and product of all living beings. All organisms constitute their own species-specific (or even 
individual-specific) lived experience. The world is projected outwards from each biotic vantage 
point, with each organism coating the world through its unique sensorimotor engagements with 
various modes of space, time, and ways of categorising, all conditions for the very possibility of 
persisting in life. A panbiotically enacted Kantianism seems to immediately suggest multicentric 
(non)anthropocentrisms of its own.  
 One difference between the autopoietic approach and the Westonian approach is that 
the latter is largely concerned with ethical considerations, while the former has been more 
concerned with ontological and epistemological issues1. For example, autopoiesis might 
interrogate how a particular being makes sense of its world, what shows up as significant for it, 
and how it responds to such signification. In short, what is the lived experience of this being, be 
it a bacterium, a begonia, a doormouse? Weston’s multicentrism does not require him to 
engage with such a bio-phenomenology (it does not forbid him either). On the other hand, many 
autopoietic theorists do not seem overly concerned with examining the ethical considerations of 
their models (the first major experiment that launched this theory is based on removing and 
replacing frog’s eyes (Lettvin, et al. 1959)). This seeming divorce between perspective and 
practice, with epistemological questions not necessarily implying ethical considerations -or vice 
versa- should give us pause. Both de-anthropocentrise through proposing multicentrisms. One 
is concerned with how things are, the other with how to best relate to those things, but neither 
seems to need to speak to the other. 
                                               
1 Something like multispecies ethnography (Kirksey and Helmreich, 2010) might be considered as 
another form of multicentric (non)anthropomorphism primarily aimed at empirical understanding 
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Both likely also vary in their conception of a 'centre.' Weston may not hold so strongly to 
biological centres and might allow that rocks are centres in some sense.2 (I have heard him 
suggest on occasion that some rocks were alive.) Autopoietic theory seems much more 
dogmatic on this point. For the latter, metabolism is a fundamental organisational difference 
between life and nonlife, and this difference brings with it a fundamentally different ontology. 
Living beings are those for whom ways of being and ways of knowing exist, and are those for 
whom ways of engaging matter. They are centres of concern, and what they are concerned with 
is directly related to their capacity to exist. 
In any case, these two examples show how perspectives that seem anthropocentric on 
one level (in holding onto the concept of a centre) might themselves be in some fundamental 
way nonanthropocentric. In the case of autopoiesis, the argument might go: if it is the case that 
every human, like all living beings, constitutes their own being as a centre and this capacity is 
itself not a human production but something 'given' to humans by nonhuman processes (such 
as evolution and metabolism), then it is clear that to be anthropocentric is nothing more than to 
be autocentric, an achievement all living beings realise through autopoiesis. On the other hand, 
Weston’s nonanthropocentrism takes seriously other being’s claim for a place in the ethical 
landscape of the earth (and for him, no doubt, the galaxy), a power enabled by the very fact he 
retains his humane (or mammalian, or biotic) instinct to care for centre-like things. 
The broader point, however, and one which we shall keep coming back to, is that neither 
category here -anthropocentric or nonanthropocentric- is stable through time. Each flip quietly 
into its opposite either immediately or under certain conditions. If the temporal dimension of 
living thought is absent from our educational considerations, the type of (non)anthropocentrisms 
we reify will not be nimble or responsive to the ongoing becoming of the world.  
 
In my view, object oriented philosophy (e.g. Harman (2003), Bryant (2011), and Bogost 
(2012)), is a more recent form of multicentrism because it seeks to preserve objects as real 
entities. It is ‘centric’ because its proponents resist dissolving apparent objects into relations as 
is prevalent in most process-based ontologies (see below). For example, Harman (2003) 
opposes the undermining of things directly experienced by reducing them either to their 
component interactions, or to their role in larger ontologically constitutional entities such as 
ecologies or assemblages. This alone might seem anthropomorphic and quite likely 
anthropocentric to a process philosopher. However, he then forwards a worldview that collapses 
the subject/object dualism by asserting that Kant’s phenomena/noumena distinction is present 
in all relations, even those between objects. Let’s unpack this. For Harman (and Bryant), 
humans experience the things around them in certain ways, and part of this experience includes 
our awareness that these things are not completely disclosed to us. Harman argues all 
interactions between things have an analogous structure. Two celestial bodies interacting 
through gravitational interaction, to take a 'physical' example, respond to how each other’s mass 
contorts spacetime3 but not to one another’s colour or smell. No object can present itself to 
another completely and only ever interacts with a subset of an object’s attributes, according to 
its own nature. And so, every thing is an object not reducible to its relations. This is a much 
                                               
2 Physicists do treat them as acting as a single object with a centre of gravitation. 
3 The range of ways that two such objects interact gravitationally is described in terms of relations 
between variables. 
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more radical pan-Kantianism than the autopoietic extension of transcendentalism to the living. 
All objects interact with each other’s appearances (phenomena) and no interactions access 
another object’s thing-in-itself (noumena). This position is radically nonanthropocentric in the 
sense that it undercuts the human as the alleged constitutor of the subject/object separation and 
the corresponding epistemological phenomena/noumena distinction. This is important because 
it posits continuity between ‘knowing’ and ‘interacting.' But for this very reason it is also 
anthropocentric by ontologising and universalising an epistemological dualism grounded in 
human experience. 
Harman escapes the anthropocentrism implicit in relational becoming such as we might 
find in modern science, Whitehead (1929), Latour (1993), and process oriented new 
materialists. But he anthropocentrises the cosmos in the opposite way. He asserts that things 
are more real than relations, and universalises a dualism gleaned through the structure of his 
own (human) experience -the appearance/reality distinction. Instead of denying the 
subject/object dualism he seeks to make it a special case of an object/object dualism, but the 
model of how the object/object dualism works was derived from his having subject/object 
dualism as a mental scheme, and using it as an analogue source to develop his alternative 
ontology. Again, the point is not that this is ‘bad’ simply because the ontology was born of and 
resides within a larger human frame. It is instead to indicate how paradoxical and unstable are 
the various forms of trying to go posthuman. 
 
What about things that are kind-of-centres? Biology gives us many examples of various 
degrees of tightness, loosening but not eliminating the notion of a centre. From plants, 
somewhere between the interconnection of a central-nervous-system-endowed animal (such as 
Darwin’s root-brain hypothesis (Baluska et al, 2009)) and a confederacy of parts (the strong 
modular claim made by Firn, 2004), to slime moulds that spend parts of their lives as single-
celled organisms and other parts in multicellularity, we are shown that being a centre is not 
always 'one' thing. While it may seem a paradox to a tightly centred being, some centres are 
less centralised than others. At the same time, the fact that our body is made up of germline 
cells and other microbial cells, each a centre of its own, but congregate into another -me or you- 
suggests centres within centres, each presumably different kinds of centres in turn. Is a virus a 
centre? On organ? What about a biome? What does it mean to be multicentric in a world where 
it is not always even necessarily clear whether or not something really is a centre? Do 
interactions in the process of becoming more centralised deserve more consideration than 
those where relations are dissociating? If there is a birth and death of centredness, how do we 
respond? 
As one ponders such questions, it is difficult to ignore the power of empirical observation 
in engaging the human mind in more complex de-centring than can be accomplished solely 
through thought alone. The concept of a centre emerged from, is challenged by, and grows 
through events in experience. Close observation of the world (of any phenomenon within it) can 
show us and affect us with its different ways, fertilise our imaginations, and is therefore always 
(in part) a decentring. Through witnessing kind-of-centres, we decentre our very notion of 
centredness. Scholars produce different kinds of (non)anthropocentrisms depending on if and 
how they engage the empirical world. If our sense of a centre is continually informed by our 
embodied experience as tightly organised autopoietic entities, the encounter of those with 
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different levels or modes of centring offers us the opportunity to stretch this conception. Without 
a tightly centralised mammalian body we might never have encountered a less tightly 
centralised slime mould as such. The point is to examine the various ways in which centres do 
and do not exist through our own centredness, how they come into and out of existence, how 
they interact together and with us, and to what effect. 
 
But surely there are many 'things' not centred in any way. What of their ethical or 
ontological standing? 
 
Science and process-centred approaches 
With some important exceptions, the broad trend in Western science, from the 
Copernican revolution, to the theory of evolution, the discovery of DNA, the revelation of the 
massive expanses of the cosmos -from superclusters down to subatomic particles-, has been 
another kind of vast deanthropocentrising. The broad trajectory has been to diminish the 
importance of humans in the cosmos, by stripping the soul, denying the power of 
consciousness, ridiculing the notion that anything (even ourselves) was made for a purpose, 
and casting us into some random corner of an enormous universe chugging towards entropic 
heat death4. When looked at from an atomic or energetic level all things appear to be in the 
process of change, all mesophysical objects (including life and love and death) but tricks of 
consciousness reminding us of our bodily disconnect from the actual becomingness of the ‘real’ 
world. However, whether or not such de-anthropocentrisms re-anthropocentrise is a complex 
and shifty question. Again, the answers depend in part on what these various 'truths' do when 
entertained, believed, or transformed into action. 
On the one hand, much of the classic scientific project, whether conceiving the world in 
terms of process and becoming, of mechanisms or atomic interactions, as material flows and 
webs, or in any other 'reduced' way (i.e. the set of activities Harman (2013) calls 'undermining'), 
obviously de-centres what we think of as human (and along with it, other organisms). Our 
struggles and dramas, thoughts and dreams, the sounds and smells that fill our sensory lives -
each is relegated to epiphenomenon. Scientific discoveries have therefore been critiqued by 
some environmentalists for their implicit undercutting of the primacy and truth of 'lived 
experience.' Abram (1996) argues that scientific truths pull us away from our senses, which 
uniquely afford experience of things 'more-than-human.' It seems Abram wants to erect a 
dichotomy between conceptual and sensory decentring while favouring the latter5. However, 
because a concept-based decentring is made possible through the embodied emplacement of a 
person in their immediate lived experience (a phenomenological centredness), these seemingly 
opposed terms layer one upon the other in interesting but complex ways. Hence scientific 
decentring is sometimes accused of decentring a more significant decentring! (Sorry, I tried to 
erase that line but couldn’t bring myself to it). 
However a world without centres is still somewhat human centred. First of all, such an 
ontology devalues the centring projects of countless other beings (i.e. approaches such as 
                                               
4 It is of course relevant to environmental educators that these discoveries remain abstract and in tension 
with a simultaneous counteractive trajectory. Demographic shifts mean humans are increasingly living in 
technologised spaces and cities that present themselves phenomenologically as generally human centric. 
5 I question the sharpness of this dichotomy elsewhere. See Affifi 2016a. 
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those of Weston and the enactivists above) in deference to an abstract metaphysical position. 
On the other hand, scientifically informed decentring is possible in large part because of our 
conceptual and perceptual organisation in the first place (a point emphasised repeatedly since 
Husserl (1954)), and the various tools and techniques we have developed to encounter the 
world for specific human purposes. However detached it might seem, it is grounded in and 
always comes back to the living, feeling, sensing body. That is, it comes back to our corporeal 
centredness. 
 
 Scientific development was crucial for the rise of contemporary process philosophy even 
if many process philosophers are dissatisfied with scientific ontology. Atomic theory, evolution, 
relativity, quantum mechanics, and chaos and complexity theory have all featured as prominent 
muses in the development of process based ontologies (this is as true for early process 
philosophers such as Whitehead 1929, Peirce (Houser and Kloesel 1992), Dewey 1925, or 
Bergson 1946, as it is for contemporary ones like DeLanda (2002), Latour (1993), Prigogine and 
Stengers (1984), Barad 2007; Dupré 2012, and Deleuze (see Villani 1991)). In various ways, 
each underemphasises the reality of beings (nouns) and lifts that becomings (verbs). This 
tendency continues in Deleuze-inspired 'new materialisms' in environmental education today 
(e.g. Clarke and McPhie 2014).  
While some might argue that becoming-centredness is 'truer' and that there persists 
somewhere some indigenous group that wisely does not 'noun' the world, an examination of 
lived experience questions this idea. While the piece of paper on my desk is in a slow process 
of transformation, --verbing an ongoing represencing and perishing event-- it does not appear 
as such in unreflected upon experience. It is only through considering the paper through various 
lenses serviced by my prior knowledge (say about the nature of decay, or my understanding 
that the atoms inside it are continuously in motion reconstituting it as paper at each passing 
moment), that I can purge my naive phenomenological take on it and see it anew. Yes, the 
paper is continuously shifting in hue as the clouds float over the sun intermittently. But it 
appears as paper continuously changing in colour. No wonder that such nounless cultures have 
not been found to exist. It is arguable whether or not a deanthropocentrising project can be 
founded on the basis of the capacity to undermine direct experience through the careful 
injection of processy conceptualisations. It seems fairer to say that all sorts of things appear as 
nouns if their rate of change is slow enough that they behave consistently for the duration of the 
interaction. Different people, cultures, and contexts may elicit varied sensitivity to such rates of 
change without shaking off the dialectical interpenetration of constancy and change. This would 
seem to apply to other organisms too, who rely on consistency in their own Umwelten (as many 
animal studies on Piagetian object constancy suggest (see Reznikova, 2007, pp. 132-139)). Of 
course, it could be argued that this conceptualisation is itself anthropocentric too, and so it is. 
But it is a more-than-anthropocentric anthropocentrism, as it acknowledges a type of distortion 
that occurs pervasively throughout the biosphere. And it is an anthropocentrism supported by 
more-than-human evolutionary processes that simply do not allow plants, animals, people or 
languages to dice up the world any way they please. Living in the world restricts how things can 
be interpreted (while collaborating in those interpretations as well). Some of these may be false 
on a broader spatiotemporal scale, but true, and necessarily true for lived (or let’s say, liveable) 
experience. 
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 Some process-oriented new materialisms (e.g. DeLanda 2003; Barad 2007) assert that 
human thinking is born of constellations of interacting processes, foregrounding something 
more-than-human in their birth, persistence, or decay. But of course, achieving this realisation 
slips the human with its epistemologically supreme vantage point, back on stage. This is clear 
when we take note of the particular manner of some (often DeLandian) new materialist frontal 
attacks upon postmodernism (a project I heartily endorse). By firmly rejecting the notion that 
language is divorced from the world and limitless in its power to diversely represent 'reality', 
such new materialisms assert that the world is in fact in some way knowable -it really does 
bump up against us, interact and intra-act with us.6 But one arrogance led to another. A 
seemingly humble agnosticism about our capacity to know the noumenal world morphs into a 
hubristic vision; the epistemological subject erecting at each moment the entire universe (as 
phenomenon) is now replaced by the equally incredible idea that we can actually know the 
world itself. We can glean the workings of the world that gave rise to the very distinction 
between subjects and objects. The workings are sufficiently human that they can be described 
in words and presented in arguments. 
 Barad’s concept of ‘agential cut’ also illustrates the fluid nature of process-oriented 
(non)anthropocentric thinking. According to Barad, subject-object distinctions are enacted in 
what she calls ‘cuts.’ However, unlike various humanists, for her they are not enacted by a 
subject, but by the broader material arrangement of which the ‘subject’ and ‘object’ are 
consequences before they are causes (p. 175-180). Barad introduces a posthuman perspective, 
but she can never escape the fact that this very conception of materiality was itself dependent 
on her human perspective (subjectivity). It is unlikely that a cat would conceive the rise of the 
subject-object cut as Barad does. Like Bennett and DeLanda, Barad’s ontology therefore is and 
isn’t anthropocentric. It is anthropocentric in the sense that it is produced by the very same 
assemblages as those ontologies she critiques: a human body, human reasoning, imagination, 
and language7. But it is not anthropocentric in that the condition she conceives for the possibility 
of such human situatedness lies in broader material dynamics.  
Some readers will detect that Barad is vulnerable to a criticism levelled at Kant centuries 
ago. Kant (2007), for his part, was also interested in the conditions for the possibility for things 
like subjectivity (which he called experience). This is where he developed his infamous 
transcendental arguments. He showed that space, time, causality, being, becoming, and a 
handful of other categories are not necessarily in the world itself. They are merely the necessary 
ways in which we must perceive and conceive things in experience. However, Kant depends on 
                                               
6 I use the word intra-act with caution. Barad (2007) created this term but appears to use it in different 
ways. In one use (that I am sympathetic of), she contrasts it to interaction, in a way that is similar to 
Dewey and Bentley’s (1949) discussion of the difference between interaction and transaction. In 
transactions, the knower and the known are seen as aspects of a total situation rather than separate 
entities. A major difference seems to be that Barad wants to insist that all relationships are intra-active, 
whereas Dewey and Bentley assert that different phenomena can be seen to relate in different ways, and 
not all are transactive. I am more suspicious of a second use of the word intra-act by Barad, where she 
wants to extend a nonlinear temporal interpretation of quantum events at the electron level to the world 
writ large. I do not yet see how entanglement between the past and future, which she describes in 
quantum events, is needed for the sort of co-constitutive relationality most commonly associated with her 
term. 
7 Moreover, the genesis of those ontologies she finds unsatisfying owe their existence to the same more-
than-human entanglements that she asserts have given rise to her own views. 
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these categories to describe this very position. In so doing, he imports apparently human ways 
of constituting appearances into the logical structure that underlies the emergence of these 
aspects of human subjectivity in the first place. How the world itself (which may or may not exist 
as it is not necessarily ‘being’ or ‘becoming’) gives rise to such a subject (given it may or may 
not operate causally) is quite a mystery. When Barad employs human conceptual structures to 
posit the causal origin of these very tools, she participates in an analogous Janus-faced 
transcendental argument. 
The paradox is clearest when she goes normative. She calls for an ethics of 
responsibility that ‘we’ are supposed to adopt in response to this ontology, even though ‘we’ are 
co-constituted and entangled, not isolated moral agents: “[w]e have to meet the universe 
halfway, to move toward what may come to be in ways that are accountable for our part in the 
world’s differential becoming” (353). There is something strange about this sentence. According 
to Barad’s argument, of course we ‘have to’ meet the universe halfway because that is how we 
emerged in the universe in the first place. Why make an ethical commandment about something 
that one cannot not do? Why amend a posthumanist position with an ethical addendum that 
repositions the human as agent? The answer, I think, is that it is inevitable that an ethical 
person will humanise an ontological position that otherwise leads to destructive attitudes. Her 
origin story was insufficiently humane for her sensibilities. 
 
Though very different thinkers, processy Barad and beingish Harman both seek to 
represent the nonrepresentational. When they do this, they invariably claim a congruence 
between their ways of conceptualising and the world itself, even if their conceptualisations deny 
any such allegiance. At root in any realism is the anthropocentric conviction that we are 
sufficiently similar to the world that our ways of thinking, observing, learning, and understanding 
are not wholly divorced from the universe that birthed us. Anthropocentric indeed, but an 
anthropocentrism that (not unlike deep ecology) brings with it a sort of identity relation however 
imperfect, and the humility that humans are created by the universe and are in complex ways in 
its image. My conviction is that this is to be embraced rather than avoided in environmental 
education (Affifi 2019). 
 
 
Meditation and experiential decentring 
Casting an eye upon the dynamics of the inner world, meditation is another way of 
decentring the human. In this case, it focuses and troubles the assumptions that come with 
being a self, -a seemingly unified, separate, and self-directing agent. For instance, meditation 
heightens awareness that thoughts and feelings are happening of their own accord. The self is 
challenged as a certain kind of causal centre (Affifi, 2016a). It is increasingly experienced not as 
an ongoing source of causal power independent of the material universe but as instead 
wrapped into a multitude of interacting processes. The meditator experiences causality as the 
property of networks of changing interactions. This web of co-dependence leads to a pluralistic 
conception of the arising of any phenomena, but most especially that of the 'self,' a process 
known in Buddhism Pratītyasamutpāda8 and commonly translating as 'dependent origination.' 
                                               
8 This word has a complex and evolving history. For some insight into the discussion of its meanings and 
uses in Buddhist practice, see Bucknell, 1999; Shulman 2007. 
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Nevertheless, during meditation one does experience this multitude at some sort of 
centre. We conceptualise that 'thinking is happening' through an entangled web of sparks and 
connectivities as the (now so-called) inner and outer world reflect and ripple upon one another. 
This is a deanthropocentrising experience as it challenges the notion 'I think' -that a subject can 
be the one actively doing thinking- and replaces it with the experience that thinking is an 
ongoing relational process between various things in experience that 'I' do not really have 
control over. While there may be some discussion over whether all cultures and languages 
conceive of the relation between subjects and verbs in this way, it is clear that such a causal 
presumption is core to the type of experience asserted in English speaking people (and other 
similarly structured languages) and their associated conceptions of what humans therefore are. 
Such insights deeply trouble the Cartesian separation between the res cogito and the res 
extensa. In that sense, this might appear a very useful tool in a deanthropocentriser’s toolbox. 
But this is where the now familiar paradox comes in: in order to 'have' the experience that 
thinking is happening in spite of us, this diverse flux of events needs to be held in some sort of 
unity. The dissolution of the ego requires an ego to experience it. We think that 'thinking is 
happening,' jump above it for a moment, and centrally organise this diverse manifold of events 
through the vantage point of a metalevel. While this metalevel immediately slips from our grasp, 
and dissolves into its own ongoing flux of thinking, a new totalising vantage point can and is 
routinely achieved. This relationship becomes more clearly experienced when we try to meditate 
because thinking itself becomes the thing we pay attention to rather than, say traffic, excel 
sheets, or Netflix. We turn and look at the looking instead of taking it for granted. 
Meditation thereby reveals with particular empirical vigour the same unstable flux 
discussed elsewhere in this article, and proves an important practice for more deeply 
understanding the relationship between anthropocentrism and nonanthropocentrism (as well as 
many other dualisms). One important advantage it offers is that it allows people to experience 
directly how seeming oppositions depend upon, and transform into one another. It is not merely 
a conceptual scheme derived from another conceptual scheme, in a regress of playful, yet 
disembodied thought games. Alongside its many benefits, it provides us with ever more clear 
awareness of what is going on, and is therefore an important way to become a better 
phenomenologist (where 'essential structures' of experience is taken very loosely).  
'Experience' and 'representation' are things that matter does when organised into certain 
types of bodies and social relationships. The antiphenomenological strain of new materialism 
(imbued in many interpretations of Deleuze and Guattari, but exemplified most specifically in the 
work of Brassier (2007)) is itself anthropocentric when it fails to accept that “experience” in its 
diverse forms is a product and process of materiality. Experience, and with it knowledge and 
representation, is only the synthesis of a Kantian subject if considered in isolation. But, as Barad 
suggests this very subject is the product of much broader complex spatiotemporal processes 
that give rise to it (and to which it eventually contributes). This means that while fallible, 
knowledge is not random or to be arbitrarily constructed at the whim of whoever holds power, 
and is rather of the world. (Of course, this does not mean we should not be critical of such 
knowledge. The world is up to some terrible things, and implicating us deeply in it). Collapsing 
materiality into that which can be third-person observed overemphasises one aspect of how 
matter creatively reconfigures itself through time. By rejecting phenomenology, some new 
materialists are implicitly betraying their anthropocentric Kantian framing of the origin and nature 
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of subjectivity9. As educators, we need to be careful of blanket condemnations. Whether or not 
phenomenology is anthropocentric depends on many moving factors. 
 
 
Anthropocentrism and anthropomorphism 
 Many observe (Plumwood 2009; Bennett 2009; Affifi 2011) that anthropomorphism and 
anthropocentrism can sometimes be a converse relationship. The methodological dogma 
common to much of science -thou shall not anthropomorphise- often leads to anthropocentric 
perspectives, ethics and behaviour. The idea is that the refusal to use one’s own experience to 
try and imagine the experience of another cuts off possibilities for empathy, understanding, and 
relationship. In Affifi (2014), I argued one should distinguish naive anthropomorphism from a 
more nuanced sort of anthropomorphism. Naive anthropomorphism assumes other creatures 
are identical to humans and thereby shuts off our capacity to acknowledge and respect their 
differences. A more engaged form of anthropomorphism participates in relationship: by 
assuming the other being is in some ways similar to us but also in some ways different, we can 
engage in interacting and understanding it, and be open to the fact that our ongoing conceptions 
of what the organism 'is' can serve as entry points into relationship but are necessarily 
temporary (Affifi 2014b). In this sense, there is a similarity between understanding other 
organisms and understanding other people, because we also continuously think we 'know' the 
other person but if the relationship is truly growthful this knowing is capable of allowing the other 
to jut through conceptions we had of them. In essence, knowing and coming to not know are in 
an ongoing dialectical relationship with one another through time. 
 That said, anthropomorphism does have a dimension of anthropocentrism to it. Each 
time we think we know what another being is, we assume that our model (consonant with our 
demands for particular forms of empirical corroboration, logic, coherence, etc.) is capable of 
representing another being. We centre our model and decentre how the other being violates it. 
Any anthropomorphism that does not open up its own representations to possible rupture by 
otherness is locked in such a conceptual anthropocentrism. However, we see that 
anthropomorphism and anthropocentrism can be dialectically entwined (and therefore so are 
anthropomorphism and nonanthropocentrism) through the way they tack back and forth through 
time. The rupture of the model is the thrusting of otherness into our schemes, made possible by 
the schemes themselves but transforming them in turn (see Affifi 2019, 2020). We could call this 
anthropomorphism’s Gadamerian (1975) dimension, in acknowledgement of his working 
                                               
9 Part of the problem is terminology. Many new materialists are committed to the term 'material' despite 
what I see as its problematic associations, while critical of associations that other suitable (or overlapping) 
terms might have. New 'materialist,' as the name suggests, emphasises matter and not mind. Even if 
some new materialists thereafter insist that 'everything' is matter is a broad term that includes thoughts 
and feelings, they are swimming against a current they themselves have created. Calling this domain of 
thought 'new naturalism' instead would avoid this problem (in the sense that any 'adequate naturalism 
must be able to account for all domains of being, including the transcendental' Grant (2011, p. 4), a point 
that the American pragmatists were also well aware of (as was Deleuze (2004) in what I understand to be 
the relationship between actualisation and counter-actualisation)). The cost, of course, is putting a foot on 
one side of the scales of another binary (natural/artefactual, etc.). Following scholars like Butler (2011), 
talk of nature and naturalism is itself deemed anthropocentric and is now (unfortunately, in my mind) 
avoided by many new materialists (Morton 2009; though see McPhie and Clarke (this issue) for some 
important taxonomical work into our modes of thinking/rethinking 'nature'). 
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through the constraints and possibilities of 'prejudice'). For Gadamer, prejudices are inevitable 
for making meaning, given we are historical beings with a stock of prior knowledge front-loading 
the structure of possible experience. A prejudice, however is a virtue in disguise. Without such 
fore-structures we would be unable to enter into any relationships as we would not have any 
context that the otherness we encounter can modulate or transform. Anthropomorphism, in the 
same vein leads to anthropocentrism when it closes people to otherness but to 
nonathropocentrism when it invites schematic rupture. However, in these dialectical dynamics 
the disorder wrought by otherness is subsequently re-organised into a new scheme indicating 
otherness is unstable. We seal the fray. This suggests a general caution about the scope and 
possibility of deanthropocentrising.'Who' is making the agential cut (Barad, 2007), and who is 
cutting the cut is not clearcut. 
 A new empiricism should recognise that the ongoing interaction between a person (or 
any organism for that matter) and its environment leads inevitably to an unfolding co-
constitution. Through ongoing relationship with a magpie I become magpiemorphised as I begin 
to consider and interact with myself through ideas, analogies, patterns of action and interaction, 
and feelings garnered from or generated through time spent with the magpie. In a more 
concrete sense, magpiemorphisation influences not merely my mental self but a more 
integrated self (that my mind arises from and contributes to): my thoughts and feelings 
magpieify as they emerge within embodied action that is itself inflected by this curious, hopping 
bird. When considering this embodied and enacted context, we see that I interact with a magpie 
that is already interacting in a way that was affected by my prior interaction with it. This infinite 
regress is not a fatuous philosophical abstraction but a very real dimension of the feedback 
nature of any interaction (see Affifi 2014b for exploration of some of these consequences). It is 
not true that I 'become' magpie, nor that the magpie 'becomes' me; we each become ourselves 
but in a way that now incorporates the ongoing co-evolution of self and other, the openness to 
alterity and the transformations that occur. A new empiricism asserts and relies on the notion 
that neither our anthropocentrisms nor our anthropomorphisms are static. Rather, they are both 
continuously reshaped by our experiences with others in our world. When treated as generic 
concepts devoid of a contextual and temporally unfolding life, these concepts can be played 
around with, and subjected to various rebellions or conformations to logic. But this necessarily 
divorces them from the developmental nature of the world and in so doing reifies the rationalistic 
approach that remains (notwithstanding itself) the dominant undercurrent in philosophy. As 
Connelly (2010) puts it 'participation in a world of becoming teaches modesty about the powers 
of argument even while appreciating its pertinence' (10). 
With a predominant focus on deanthropocentrising the human, there is the risk that we 
persist in anthropocentrising our focus despite (or rather because of) our efforts. In other words, 
it is not sufficient merely to focus on the human as a subject to be deanthropocentrised. We 
must devote ourselves to developing the sensitivities and capacities to understand, theorise and 
learn deeply from the rest of the universe beyond the deanthroposised anthropos. Our work is 
'environmental education,' which (should) by definition involve a world of myriad creatures, 
beings, and processes. The logocentric obsessions inherited from postmodernism have taken 
environmental education theory and practice away from its traditionally sustained engagement 
with the nonhuman world and have explicitly or implicitly associated any such engagement with 
some sort of naive or corrupted scientism. New materialism could restore such an engagement 
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with the diverse world, sharing and honouring the delight of both kinship and otherness, but 
without the conceits of earlier epistemologies that assert uncontroversial access to the world for 
the deified western subject (see Affifi 2019, 2020). But to do this, it needs to get beyond 
articulating what humans are and are not in generic ontological terms, and pay attention to the 
processes and transformations of the actual world. We should not be coy about taking science 




 Why highlight anthropocentrism’s fluid binary? Certainly not to enable business as usual 
through some new relativism! Without question, I too am sickened by activities my colleagues 
diagnose as “anthropocentric.” I agree that many humans need to spend more time paying 
attention to other beings and have invested time reconstructing education theory and practice 
accordingly (e.g. Affifi 2015, 2016b). I am not aiming to shallow ecology, but to deepen it ever 
further by drawing attention to the extent of nature’s interconnectedness. Any conception is 
anthropocentric insofar as it is framed by the human mind and heart, but equally 
nonanthropocentric because all human activity emerges from and persist within a vast field of 
beings and processes. The dialectic at the heart of this paper, that all anthropocentrisms are 
nonanthropocentric and vice versa, ultimately owes itself to an existential paradox: we are 
aware that we are, as Plumwood (1993) noted, both separate from and interconnected with the 
world. This is not just a language game, it is a fundamental binary manifest in all beings. The 
essence of “being” is the emergence of an entity sufficiently individuated from the flux to persist, 
but whose persistence depends wholly on that flux. There is a centralisation inherent in being, 
as much in flames and stones and ideas as paramecia and apes. Ultimately, the most profound 
nonanthropocentrisms are not those that deny centrism, but that recognise its unavoidability, 
work with its strengths, and are vigilant against it leading us astray. We cannot allow 
anthropocentrism to colonise noncentrism or vice versa, because both aspects exist. Wise 
decisions come from struggling with this paradox rather than concocting a metaphysics that 
collapses it, one side or the other.  
Some questions we must continuously try to ask: what does a given deanthropocentrism 
do? Does it actually lead us to attend to the field of more-than-human presences around us? 
Does it invite us to relate to the birch trees and magpies around us, and to recreate our 
environments to enable such relationships? Does it actually compel us to stand in front of the 
bulldozers? Does it create beauty? Or, despite its claim to radical nonhumanness, does it 
instead merely invite us into more arguments, more time in front of computers, and more 
wandering around stuffy conference rooms? In the pragmatist tradition, Weston (1991) for 
example recognises that thoughts and environmental contexts are entertwined in an ecology. 
This means it does not make sense to focus on fixing the worldview without fixing the world. An 
abstracted deanthropocentrism easily parcels itself off and operate merely in a realm of 
discourse games without changing any actual (de)anthropocentrised relations. On the other 
hand, some physical intervention (say building a bat house) might be done for human reasons 
(e.g. we want bats around so we have less mosquitos), but inadvertently deanthropocentrise our 
thinking and feelings by acquainting us with the styles and personalities of bats, perhaps inviting 
us to consider what it might be like to be a bat (without Nagel (1974) coming first) in order to 
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help it flourish. In other words, the direction a given (de)anthropocentrising manoeuvre is 
heading is often more relevant than its intention.  
Ways of framing transcend themselves, not merely reproducing particular modalities of 
thinking, feeling and acting but also opening up new fields of possibility. We can 
deanthropocentrise towards biocentrism, towards ecocentrism (Callicott 1989), towards multiple 
centres (Weston 2004), or towards a complete lack of centre (which thereby creates its own 
process or material oriented centrism (Deleuze and Guattari, 1972)). But each unfolds 
unexpectedly as well, giving rise to new mental and material events with their own unexpected 
trajectories in turn. This dynamic, which Kauffman describes as the movement into the “adjacent 
possible” (Kauffman 2000; Hoffmeyer 2004), pervades the universe, within and without. This is 
what we need to commit to painstakingly observing and engaging, through discussions and 
experiments, actively with students and in the context of real, lived encounters. Asking such 
questions is performative, even and especially when no definitive answers can be found. We 
are thrown into complex ecologies that change amidst our very attempts to understand them. 
Asking what a given belief does is more about opening a stance towards the world that fosters 
virtues necessary for reorienting ourselves within our ecologies, such as “ecological humility” 
(Kopnina et al 2018a). Ecological humility is not just a cultivation of epistemological uncertainty 
and openness before the ecosystems “outside” [sic] us. It is work holistic work that recognises 
our beliefs and ontologies emerge from, separate from and reunite with, and feedback into the 
very ecologies that call us to pause. To paraphrase Bateson (1979), the biosphere is a mental 
ecology that contains the human mind. 
 The question of where a given conception leads relates directly to another point already 
suggested in the introduction. Many attempts at nonanthropocentrism are not actually possible 
to live. For example, the idea that we treat all living organisms as equal centres of value (for 
example, Taylor’s 'biospheric egalitarianism' (1986) or Lupinacci and Harpel-Parkin’s 
“nonanthropocentrism” (2016) can really only be briefly entertained conceptually and affectively. 
Within hours, the would-be egalitarian will value themselves over some other to acquire 
nutrients and calories. Indeed, they will need these calories to fuel their arguments, implicitly 
valuing the ends they hope their arguments will achieve over the particular life forms sacrificed 
to produce them. But this does not necessarily mean that 'impossible nonanthropocentrisms' are 
without value. They may still serve to guide action, to push people to be ever more 
compassionate or sensitive to their local and systemic impacts on the world. Let’s call them 
strategic nonanthropocentrisms (in the vein of Spivak’s (1990) 'strategic essentialism' and 
Bennett’s (2009) 'strategic anthropomorphism'). In other words, nonanthropocentrisms may still 
function as ideals regulating action (the pragmatic notion of a regulative ideal comes from Kant’s 
third critique (1790)). Of course, in keeping with the observations of this paper, holding such an 
ideal -or 'end in view' to use Dewey’s (1922) term- as a way of directing action is itself a very 
human thing to do and valuing this particular way of teleologically investing behaviour with a 
future is therefore another form of anthropocentrism. 
 Similarly, some attempts at nonanthropocentrism are at best experienced or practiced 
only sometimes. As such, it is crucial that educators consider critically whether they actually 
have the potential to carry over into people’s otherwise anthropocentric lives. For example, the 
experience of ‘self realisation’ characterised by deep ecology can be an aesthetic oneness or a 
deep universal empathy, but these states are not sustained. Educating for sustainability does 
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not suggest we make some fleeting ontological experience universal but that we move beyond 
the tendency to search for a particular 'ism' that, if adopted, would carry us to salvation (for this 
reason, the important critiques of Kopnina (e.g. 2012) are incomplete). It is an empirical 
question (to be settled through self-reflection and through observing others), whether deep 
ecology or any other ecstatic and temporary experience has the capacity to modify actions 
when people are back to their nondeep daily encounters, and if so whether it does so any better 
than some alternate conception or experience. It is my suspicion that we need to move towards 
a more flexible and pluralistic notion of what frameworks, experiences, and emotions are 
'needed,' and to develop the general capacity to become more aware of when and how our 
various ways of looking at the world are motivating or demotivating to us and to others. 
Sustainability education might be a contemplative practice (see Eaton et al. 2017) before it is a 
set of (metaphysical, ethical, or scientific) propositions to be accepted and transformed into 
action. 
 And still, I suspect some apparent nonanthropocentrisms are best taken in the smallest 
of dosages, if at all. 
 That ‘taking action’ is itself obviously anthropocentric (Taylor 2017), grounded as it is on 
the idea that we transform the world according to our own values, reveals another variation of 
the theme suffusing this article. Recognising anthropocentrism’s fluid binary does not imply we 
put anthropocentrism and attempts to transcend it on equal footing (Wals and Jickling 2002). 
Anthropocentrism is an urgent problem. But nonanthropocentrism is an insufficiently ecological 
solution. We can take action to seek (non)anthropocentric values committed to biotic flourishing. 
This, to me, is the crucial issue. How do we help learners become more versatile at abandoning 
and restructuring the stock of approaches they deploy when their repertoire does not actually 
participate in the flourishing of people and the earth? Rather than seek to overcome 
anthropocentrism itself, we can inspire students in the arts of contemplation, guiding them in 
better observing, listening, reflecting upon, and experimenting with their various 
(non)anthropocentrisms in theory, in feeling, and in practice. 
 
 This foray into anthropocentrism’s fluid binary is intended to illustrate the importance of 
philosophy for environmental education. I hope the reader will see this potency even if (or 
especially when) my particular arguments fail. It is easy to lock into beliefs that we think are 'part 
of the solution', and it is a normal to be less critical of those beliefs than those which contradict 
them. In a complex and ever-evolving world, sustainability would seem to require the capacity to 
unsustain habitual patterns of thought that are no longer helpful for understanding or engaging 
(sustain/unsustain: another fluid binary?). It is not sufficient to merely develop 'critical thinking' 
skills, as these often merely sharpen one’s saber blade while keeping it pointed at illusory 
enemies. The exciting sense of wonder that comes through breaking down one’s own cherished 
assumptions is an experience few people know how to embrace. Uncertainty is insecurity. 
These are fears the typical classroom culture is committed to continue quietly stoking. A flexible 
and responsive attention to any complex theoretical/material sustainability issue will require a 
completely reimagined pedagogy, one that delights in baffling journeys and the humility such 
journeys may bring. Revealing the instability and paradoxes inherent in (non)human reasoning 
is a part of this project. 
 
Ramsey Affifi 
This is the accepted author manuscript. The final version accepted Dec 17th 2019 in 




Affifi, Ramsey. 2011. “What Weston’s Spider and My Shorebirds Might Mean for Bateson’s 
Mind: Some Educational Wanderings in Interspecies Curricula.” Canadian Journal of 
Environmental Education 16: 46-58. 
 
Affifi, Ramsey. 2014a. “Drawing analogies in environmental education.” Canadian Journal of 
Environmental Education 19: 80-93. 
 
Affifi, Ramsey. 2014b. “Biological pedagogy as concern for semiotic growth.” Biosemiotics 7 (1) 
73-88. 
 
Affifi, Ramsey. “Educating in a multispecies world”. PhD dissertation. 
 
Affifi, Ramsey. 2016a. “More-than-humanizing the Anthropocene.” The Trumpeter 32 (2) 155-
175. 
 
Affifi, Ramsey. 2016b. “The metabolic core of environmental education.” Studies in Philosophy 
and Education 36 (3): 315-332. 
 
Affifi, Ramsey. 2019. Restoring realism: Themes and variations. Environmental Education 
Research. DOI:10.1080/13504622.2019.1699026 
 
Affifi, Ramsey. 2020. Between will and wildness in STEAM education. In "Why science and art 
creativities matter: STEAM (re)configurings for future-making education" (Eds. Pamela Burnard 
& Laura Colucci-Gray). Brill / Sense. 
 
Attfield, Robin. 2011. “Beyond anthropocentrism.” Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 69: 
29-46. 
 
Abram, David. 1996. The spell of the sensuous. New York: Vintage Books. 
 
Baluška, Frantisek, Mancuso, Stephano, Volkmann, D., & Barlow, P.W. (2009). “The ‘root-brain’ 
hypothesis of Charles and Francis Darwin: Revival after more than 125 years.” Plant Signalling 
and Behaviour 4 (12): 1121-1127. 
 
Barad, Karen. 2007. Meeting the universe halfway. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. 
 
Bateson, Gregory. 1979. Mind and nature: A necessary unity. New York: E.P. Dutton. 
 
Bell, A. & Russell, C. (2000). “Beyond human, beyond words: Anthropocentrism, critical 
pedagogy, and the poststructuralist turn.” Canadian Journal of Education 25 (3), 188-203. 
 
Ramsey Affifi 
This is the accepted author manuscript. The final version accepted Dec 17th 2019 in 
Environmental Education Research under title Affifi (2019) “Anthropocentrism’s fluid binary.” 
Bennett, Jane. 2009. Vibrant matter. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. 
 
Bergson, Henri. 1946. The creative mind. Translated by Mabelle L. Andison. New York: The 
Citadel Press. 
 
Bogost, Ian. 2012. Alien phenomenology. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
 
Bonnett, Michael. 2004. Retrieving nature: Education for a post-humanist age. Cornwall, UK: 
Blackwell. 
 
Brassier, Ray. 2007. Nihil unbound. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave MacMillan. 
 
Bryant, Levi (2011) The democracy of objects. London, UK: Open Humanities Press. 
 
Bucknell, Roderick S. 1999, “Conditioned Arising Evolves: Variation and Change in Textual 
Accounts of the Paticca-samupadda Doctrine”, Journal of the International Association of 
Buddhist Studies 22 (2): 311-342. 
 
Butler, Judith (2011). Bodies that matter. London, UK: Routledge. 
 
Callicott, John B. 1989. In defense of the land ethic: Essays in environmental philosophy. 
Albany, NY: SUNY Press. 
 
Clarke, David A., & Mcphie, Jamie (2014). “Becoming animate in education: Immanent 
materiality and outdoor learning for sustainability.” Journal of Adventure Education and Outdoor 
Learning 14 (3), 198-216. 
 
Connelly, William E. 2010. A world of becoming. Durham, NC: Duke university press. 
 
DeLanda, Manuel. 2002. Intensive science and virtual philosophy. London, UK: Continuum. 
 
Deleuze, Gilles. (2004). The logic of sense. London, UK: Continuum. 
 
Deleuze, Gilles & Felix Guattari. 1972. Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. London: 
Continuum. 
 
Derrida, Jacques. 1998. Of Grammatology. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
 
Dewey, John. 1925. Experience and Nature. New York, NY: Dover. 
 
Dewey, John. 1922. Human nature and conduct. New York, NY: Henry Holt. 
 
Dewey, John & Arthur Bentley. 1949. Knowing and the known. Boston: Beacon Press. 
 
Ramsey Affifi 
This is the accepted author manuscript. The final version accepted Dec 17th 2019 in 
Environmental Education Research under title Affifi (2019) “Anthropocentrism’s fluid binary.” 
Drenthen, Martin. 2011. “Ecocentrism as anthropocentrism.” Ethics, Policy and Environment 14 
(2), 151-154.. 
 
Dupré, John. 2012. Processes of life. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. 
 
Eaton, Marie, Hughes, Holly J., and Jean MacGregor (Eds.) 2017. Contemplative approaches to 
sustainability in higher education. New York: Routledge. 
 
Firn, Richard. 2004. “Plant intelligence: an alternative point of view.” Annals of Botany 93 (4): 
345–35. 
 
Gadamer, Hans-Georg. 1975. Truth and method. London, UK: Continuum. 
 
Grant, Iain H. 2011. “Movements of the world: The sources of transcendental philosophy.” 
Analecta Hermeneutica 3, 1-17. 
 
Grey, William. 1993 “Anthropocentrism and Deep Ecology.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 
71 (4), 463-47. 
 
Hargrove, E. (1992). “Weak anthropocentric instrinsic value.” The Monist 75 (2), 183-207. 
 
Harman, Graham (2013). Bells and whistles. Zero Books. 
 
Harman, Graham. 2005. Guerilla metaphysics: Phenomenology and the carpentry of things. 
Chicago, IL: Open Court Publishing. 
 
Heidegger, Martin. 2010. Being and time. Translated by Joan Stambaugh. Albany, NY: SUNY 
Press. 
 
Hoffmeyer, Jesper. 2004. “Uexküllian Planmässigkeit.” Sign Systems Studies 32 (1): 73-97. 
 
Houser, Nathan and Christian JW Kloesel Eds. 1992. Essential Peirce Volume 1. Bloomington, 
IN: Indiana University Press. 
 
Hovardas, Tasos. 2013. “A Critical Reading of Ecocentrism and Its Meta-Scientific Use of 
Ecology: Instrumental Versus Emancipatory Approaches in Environmental Education and 
Ecology Education.” Science & Education 22 (6): 1467-1483. 
 
Husserl, Edmund. 1954/1970. The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental 
Phenomenology: An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy. Evanston, IL: Northeastern 
University Press. 
 
Kahn, Richard. 2010. Critical pedagogy, ecoliteracy, and the planetary crisis: The ecopedagogy 
movement. New York: Peter Lang. 
Ramsey Affifi 
This is the accepted author manuscript. The final version accepted Dec 17th 2019 in 
Environmental Education Research under title Affifi (2019) “Anthropocentrism’s fluid binary.” 
 
Kahn, Richard. 2007. “Anthropocentrism.” In Paul Robbins (Ed.) Encyclopedia of Environment 
and Society. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. 
 
Kant, Immanuel. 2007. Critique of pure reason. (Norman Kemp, translator). New York: Palgrave 
MacMillan. 
 
Kant, Immanuel. 1790/2000. Critique of the power of judgment. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
Katz, Eric. 2000. “Against the inevitability of anthropocentrism.” Chapt. 2 in Beneath the 
Surface: Critical Essays in the Philosophy of Deep Ecology, edited by Eric Katz, Andrew Light, 
David Rothenberg, 17-42. Cambridge, MA: MIT press. 
 
Kauffman, Stuart A. (2000). Investigations. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Kirksey, Eben and Helmreich, Stefan. 2010. ”The Emergence of Multispecies Ethnography.” 
From the Editorial Office, Cultural Anthropology website, June 14, 2010. 
 
Kopnina, Helen. 2012. “Education for sustainable development (ESD): the turn away from 
‘environment’ in environmental education?” Environmental Education Research 18 (5): 699-717. 
 
Kopnina, Helen, Sitka-Sage, Michael D.D., Blenkinsop, Sean and Laura Piersol. 2018a. Moving 
beyond innocence: Educating children in a post-nature world. In Cutter-Mackenzie (Ed) 
Research Handbook on Childhoodnature, Dorchtrect: Springer. 
 
Kopnina, Helen, Washington, Haydn, Taylor, and John J. Piccolo. 2018b. “Anthropocentrism: 
More than just a misunderstood problem.” Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 31 
(1): 109-127. 
 
Latour, Bruno. 1993. We have never been modern. Translated by Catherine Porter. Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press 
 
Lettvin, Jerome Y., Humberto R. Maturana., Warren S. McCulloch, and Walter H. Pitts. 1959. 
“What the frog’s eye tells the frog’s brain.” Proceedings of the IRE. 1940-1951. 
 
Lupinacci, John, and Alison Happel-Parkins. 2016. (Un)learning anthropocentrism: An 
EcoJustice framework for teaching to resist human-supremacy in schools. In S. Rice and A.G. 
Rudd (Eds.) The educational significance of human and non-human animal interactions. 
Pagrave MacMillan. 
 




This is the accepted author manuscript. The final version accepted Dec 17th 2019 in 
Environmental Education Research under title Affifi (2019) “Anthropocentrism’s fluid binary.” 
Martusevicz, Rebecca A., Jeff Edmonson, and John Lupinacci. 2011. Ecojustice Education: 
Towards diverse, democratic and sustainable communities. New York: Routledge. 
 
Massumi, Brian. Deleuze, Gilles; Guattari, Félix (1987) [1980]. A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism 
and Schizophrenia. Capitalism and Schizophrenia. 2. Trans. and foreword by Brian Massumi. 
Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press. p. xvi.  
 
Maturana, Humberto. and Fransisco Varela. 1988. The Tree of Knowledge.Boston, MA: 
Shambhala. 
 
McPhie, Jamie. & David A.G. Clarke. (this issue). “Nature matters: Diffracting a keystone 
concept of environmental education research - Just for kicks.” Environmental Education 
Research. 
 
Morton, Timothy. 2009. Ecology without nature. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
 
Mylius, Ben. 2018. “Three types of anthropocentrism.” Environmental Philosophy. DOI: 
10.5840/envirophil20184564 
 
Naess, Arne. 1973. “The Shallow and the Deep, Long-Range Ecology Movement” Inquiry 16: 
95-100. 
 
Nagel, Thomas. 1974. “What is it like to be a bat?” The Philosophical Review 83 (4): 435-450. 
 
Nietzsche, Friedrich. 1966. Beyond good and evil. New York: Random House (W. Kauffman, 
trans.). 
 
Passmore, J. 1974. Man's Responsibility for Nature. London: Duckworth 
 
Payne, Phillip G. 2010. “The globally great moral challenge: Ecocentric democracy, values, 
morals and meaning.” Environmental Education Research (16) 1: 153-171. 
 
Plumwood, Val. 1993. Feminism and the Mastery of Nature. London, UK: Routledge 
 
Prigogine, Ilya, and Stengers, Isabelle. 1984. Order out of chaos: Man’s new dialogue with 
nature. New York: Bantam. 
 
Quinn, Frances, Jeremy Castéra, and Pierre Clément. 2015. ”Teachers’ Conceptions of the 
Environment: Anthropocentrism, Nonanthropocentrism, Anthropomorphism and the Place of 
Nature.” Environmental Education Research 22 (6): 893–917. 
 
Rautio, Pauliina. 2012. “Being nature: interspecies articulation as a species-specific practice of 
relating to environment.” Environmental Education Research 19 (4): 445-457. 
 
Ramsey Affifi 
This is the accepted author manuscript. The final version accepted Dec 17th 2019 in 
Environmental Education Research under title Affifi (2019) “Anthropocentrism’s fluid binary.” 
Regan, Tom. 1983. The case for animal rights. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. 
 
Reznikova, Zhanna. 2007. Animal intelligence: From individual to social cognition. Cambridge, 
UK: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Rolston, Holmes 1999. Genes, genesis, and God. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Shaviro, Steven. 1997. Doom Patrols. London, UK: Serpent’s Tail. 
 
Spannring, Reingard. 2017. “Animals in environmental education.” Environmental Education 
Research 23 (1): 63-74. 
 
Shulman, Eviatar. 2007. 'Early Meanings of Dependent-Origination', Journal of Indian 
Philosophy 36:297-317. 
 
Singer, Peter. 1975. Animal liberation. New York, NY: HarperCollins. 
 
Spivak, Gayatri C. (Sarah Harasym, ed.) 1990. The Post-colonial Critic. New York, NY: 
Routledge. 
 
Taylor, Affrica. 2017. “Beyond stewardship: Common world pedagogies for the Anthropocene.” 
Environmental Education Research 23 (10): 1448-1461. 
 
Taylor, Paul W. 1986. Respect for Nature. A Theory of Environmental Ethics. Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press. 
 
Thompson, Evan. 2007. Mind in Life. Cambridge MA: University of Harvard Press. 
 
Van der Tuin, Iris. & Rick Dolphijn. 2012. New materialism: Interviews and Cartographies. 
London, UK: Open Humanities Press 
 
Von Uexkull, Jakob (2011). A foray into the worlds of animals and humans with a theory of 
meaning. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
 
Villani, Arnaud. 1999. La guêpe et l'orchidée: Essai sur Gilles Deleuze. Paris: Éditions de Belin. 
 
Wals, A.E.J. and Bob Jickling. 2002. “’Sustainability’ in higher education: From doublethink and 
newspeak to critical thinking and meaningful learning.” International Journal of Sustainability in 
Higher Education 3 (3): 221-232. 
 
Weston, Anthony 2004. ”Multi-Centrism: A Manifesto”, Environmental Ethics 26: 25-40. 
 
Weston, Anthony 1998. “Universal consideration as an originary practice.” Environmental Ethics 
20 (3): 279-289. 
Ramsey Affifi 
This is the accepted author manuscript. The final version accepted Dec 17th 2019 in 
Environmental Education Research under title Affifi (2019) “Anthropocentrism’s fluid binary.” 
 
Weston, Anthony 1991. “Non-Anthropocentrism in a Thoroughly Anthropocentrized World.” The 
Trumper 8 (3): 1-9. 
 
Whitehead, Alfred N. 1929. Process and Reality. London, UK: Free Press. 
 
 
 
 
